The first thing most IT security pros think when they read, “DLP is a program or a process — not a product,” is, “A program sounds a lot more complicated and expensive than a product.” But that doesn’t have to be the case. In my last blog, I outlined 10 key steps to building a simplified insider threat program that’s based around three key workflows: departing employees, organizational change and high-risk employees. We believe these three scenarios account for 80% of insider threat.
Today, we’re diving into the first workflow: departing employees.
It’s a big problem, and it’s only getting bigger
Even the very best places to work are feeling the pain of this growing challenge. People are changing jobs more frequently than ever, a trend that started shortly after the recession and has continued accelerating: Employee “quits” (voluntary departures) have risen every year since 2010, according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. A recent survey suggests more than half of U.S. workers will look for a new job in 2019 — and half of those new-job-seekers haven’t even been at their current gig for a full year. One big reason: employees increasingly don’t have the same feelings of loyalty toward their employers — in fact, they fully expect to switch jobs frequently in order to stay fresh and grow. With the job market remaining strong (especially for in-demand knowledge workers), their confidence in finding a new job is as high as ever.
And when they leave, they’re taking valuable and/or sensitive data with them. The Code42 2018 Data Exposure Report showed that roughly half of employees admit to taking IP with them when they leave. Even more concerning: The higher you go in the company, the more likely data is walking out the door with over 70% of execs admitting to taking IP from one employer to the next.
It’s not black and white
The risk posed by departing employees tends to be viewed in absolute terms. Most organizations assume that 99.9% of employees would NEVER take anything or do anything risky. “They’re good people; they know better,” is something we hear all too often. On the flip side, most assume that any employee that does take data is doing so maliciously. The reality is that there’s a tremendous gray area. Most people aren’t outright stealing. They’re doing things like:
- Pulling together their best work to help them land a new job
- Taking the work they’re most proud of with them
- Taking things like templates to use in their new gig
- Taking “their” client info
- Deleting files to “help” clean up their devices for the next user
- Even just sharing work with colleagues, or pulling important working files onto thumb drive to give to a current colleague to ensure the project keeps moving forward after they leave
Most have good (if self-centered) intentions. But they’re still taking actions that put the company at risk.
Offboarding is just as important as onboarding
While most organizations dedicate significant time and resources to their employee onboarding program, offboarding gets far less attention. In fact, most organizations don’t have a specific and consistent workflow to account for the unique data exposure risks surrounding a departing employee much less involve the security team if they actually do have a process.
Building a departing employee workflow
With employee departures accelerating across the workforce — you need to have a dedicated program to account for these risks. So, what should that program look like? Here are a handful of best practices that simplify the task:
- Have a corporate policy. You may think your idea of data theft is universal. It’s not. Every organization needs an explicit, written policy around employee data exfiltration: what they can and can’t take; where they can and can’t move data; and how they should go about getting permission to take files or data upon their departure.
- Publicize the policy. Bad habits are hard to break. Make data protection best practices part of employee onboarding. But also make sure data exfiltration review is part of the offboarding process. A simple reminder can go a long way toward preventing well-intentioned employees from doing something they shouldn’t.
- Create a departing employee trigger — and execute the workflow every time. Most organizations have a new employee trigger, owned by HR, that automatically sets in motion an onboarding process that includes everything from training to IT and security teams giving the new employee the access privileges they’ll need. HR should also have a departing employee trigger that automatically sets in motion an offboarding process that includes a security analysis of the employee’s data activity to account for potential risks. Just like onboarding, this departing employee workflow should be followed for every departing employee — not just those you consider high-risk.
- Go back in time. A common mistake is to think employees start taking data after they give notice or right before they leave. Moreover, most employee monitoring tools only start monitoring an employee once notice is given. The reality is that the risky activity most often occurs much, much earlier — as they’re looking for a new job; after they’ve accepted another position, but before they’ve given notice; etc. To account for this reality, best practice is to analyze departing employee activity going back months from the day they give notice.
- Build a “red flag” list with LOB. By focusing on just departing employees, you’ve already dramatically narrowed the scope of the security analysis from the traditional, “classify ALL your data” approach of legacy DLP. But you can hone in further by engaging LOB leaders to build a specific list of your organization’s most valuable files and file types: source code for tech companies, CAD drawings at an engineering firm, Salesforce files and customer lists, spreadsheets with financial info, codenames for R&D projects, etc. Make sure your monitoring tools allow you search and filter activity by file type, file name, etc., so you can quickly look for these red-flag activities.
- Search for common signs of suspicious activity. In addition to looking at specific file categories, your monitoring tools should also allow you to easily see when file activity deviates from normal patterns (a spike, e.g.), to search specifically for after-hours or weekend activity (when suspicious activity often occurs), and to uncover suspicious file mismatches (i.e., a customer list file is renamed “photo of my daughter” and the MIME type doesn’t match the extension).
A departing employee workflow example
Here’s a rough look at how a departing employee workflow…works:
Employee gives notice, triggering activity review by IT security.
Security looks back at the past 90 days of employee data activity, searching for suspicious or risky actions.
3) ACTIVITY FLAGGED
Security flags suspicious activity: a product pricing spreadsheet that was emailed to an external address.
4) HR/LOB REVIEW
Security restores the spreadsheet and brings it to HR. HR brings it to the LOB manager. LOB manager confirms that emailing pricing document was not authorized.
5) ESCALATION TO LEGAL
Depending on the activity and severity of the risk, the issue may be escalated to legal.
It all depends on visibility
The departing employee workflow — like your entire insider threat program — depends on visibility. To be able to look back at the last 90 days of a departing employee’s activity, you can’t be working with a DLP or monitoring solution that only kicks on after the employee gives notice. You need to be continuously monitoring all data activity, so you’re instantly ready to execute a 90-day security analysis of any employee, as soon as they give notice. This visibility can’t be limited to file names. To get to the bottom of suspicious activity and act with confidence, you need the ability to restore and review any version of any file — so you can see if it’s really a problem. With this kind of always-on monitoring, you can enable the kinds of targeted triggers that focus your attention where it matters most — and act quickly to mitigate risk and potential damage from the many things departing employees take with them when they leave.
Insider Threat Is Real